Mass Protests, Security-Elite Defection, and Revolution

Apolte,Thomas

Research article (journal) | Peer reviewed

Abstract

Political regimes will survive even intense mass protests as long as the security elite abstains from defecting. However, empirical and theoretical work has shown that coups, as the active form of security-elite defection, become more likely under mass protests. Still, many regimes collapsed under mass protests without a coup ever happening. In these no-coup situations, we demonstrate, using case studies, that the security elite did in fact abandon loyalty to the regime, albeit in a passive fashion. We develop a model that explains why mass protests can induce the security-elite members to coordinate on passive security-elite defection, thus paving the way for a full-fledged revolution. With our model, we work out the parameters under which passive security-elite defection is likely. Finally, by systematically relating our model to our cases, we demonstrate how mass protests triggered security-elite defection in a number of particular historical cases of revolution.

Details about the publication

JournalJournal of Comparative Economics (J Comp Econ)
Volume50
Page range981-996
StatusPublished
Release year2022
Language in which the publication is writtenEnglish
DOI10.1016/j.jce.2022.07.001
KeywordsAutocracy; Coups; Mass Protest; Revolution

Authors from the University of Münster

Apolte, Thomas
Professur für Ökonomische Politikanalyse (Prof. Apolte)